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NEW REASONS TO ESTABLISH  
PHILOSOPHY OF FILM 




Towards a New Approach 
 
During the last few decades, film has increasingly become an issue of 
philosophical reflection from an ontological and epistemological 
perspective and the claim “doing philosophy through film” has raised 
extensive discussion about its meaning. This book aims to reassess, over 
100 years after the invention of film, the question “What is film?” as a 
philosophical interrogation emphasizing an intrinsic relation between 
philosophy and film. The mechanical reproduction of reality is one of the 
very philosophical questions raised by the emergence of film at the end of 
the XIXth Century, inquiring into the ontological nature of both reality and 
film. Yet the nature of this audio-photographic and moving reproduction 
of reality constitutes an ontological puzzle, which has widely been 
disregarded as a main line of enquiry with direct consequences for 
philosophy.  
The filmic re-production of reality has profoundly changed our relation 
to reality itself: on the one hand we have the image of reality, on the other 
hand the image dominating reality, tending to substitute reality, becoming 
real in itself. As deep-rooted cave dwellers we have learned how to switch 
sides: film enables us to double our being-in-the-world, to overcome the 
subjective condition by reproducing it. It constitutes a unique way of how 
we can look at reality from the inside on the outside, how we can think 
within x from outside x, and it is a device to overcome the limits of reason 
established since Kant. This switch of perspective on reality implies a 
change of thought and of knowledge, which has not only established film 
as a form of philosophy, but altered philosophy itself: “There is always a 
time, midday-midnight, when we must no longer ask ourselves 'What is 
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cinema?' but 'What is philosophy?’”1, proposes Gilles Deleuze, and to this 
purpose we ask: how has philosophy changed through film? And 
furthermore, what does it mean to understand film as philosophizing? Can 
we access specific, reliable knowledge of the world and our relation to it 
through the aesthetic form of moving images? What is, after all, the 
essence of film in general and, most specifically, regarding the reproduction of 
reality?  
Regarding this background, we have selected the best essays from our 
Lisbon Conference on Philosophy and Film: Thinking Reality and Time 
through Film (2014). What they all have in common is the attempt to 
create new aspects and approaches of how philosophy relates to film. 
Whether by philosophizing through concrete examples of films or whether 
looking at film’s ontological reliance on time and image, or its intra-active 
entanglement with reality or truth, this book is intended to grasp film’s 
nature philosophically and provide new insights for the film philosopher 
and the filmmaker as well as for the freshman fascinated by film for 
philosophical reasons. We have complemented the list of classical 
philosophical essays with the reworked transcriptions of two compelling 
film-philosophical dialogs among filmmakers and philosophers, which 
took place at pivotal moments of the Conference and which will now bring 
to the book the vivacity of the personal reflections of the creators, drawing 
on their own works at the crossroads of a robust philosophical inquiry.  
Conversely, this volume makes a distinctive contribution to the field, 
by deepening the philosophical discussion of the ontological co-
implication of time and reality as fuelled by the paradoxical phenomenon 
of the cinematographic image. Furthermore, it is our aim to establish parts 
of this volume as an epistemological contribution to the recent ontological 
turn in philosophy, by attempting to approach film as a special way to 
access truth. And finally, through different approaches, we hope to lay out 
the intrinsic relation between film and philosophy. 
Overview of the Included Essays  
In the first part of the book entitled “Mental Approaches: On the Nature of 
Time, Perception and Images” we have collected texts which open up new 
mental or subjective dimensions of film, reflecting on the nature of time, 
perception and image, as well as describing cinematic narrative as the 
most adequate vehicle for elucidating personal identity.  
                                                 
1  Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert 




In her article “The Image of Temporality”, Maria-Teresa Teixeira 
engages in a full intermedial discussion of the interlocked models of 
sculpture, photography, cinema, painting and music, in relation to the 
fundamentals of Bergson’s philosophy of time, movement, space and 
consciousness. Starting from the famous analogy between our usual 
perception of the world and the workings of the recently invented 
cinematograph, Teixeira contends that Bergson’s recourse to this example 
should be seen solely as an analogy to stress the similitude between our 
intellect and the mechanical aspect of cinema. However, just as our 
spatializing intellect does not strictly eliminate temporal intuition, so too 
in cinema the mechanical aspect does not impair the artistic élan. In a final 
twist, which expresses her theoretical contribution to the ontological 
debate about cinema, Teixeira imports from an unexpected quarter what 
we could call her musical explanation of cinema as pure durée: in fact, 
music reveals to us a movement without any underlying mobile, whose 
ontological truth is that reality is process, not substance. Finally, it is 
shown that cinema, thanks to the accrued, non-human powers of 
technological mediation, can not only depict movement and change, albeit 
its ruling mechanism, but do it better than natural perception and human 
insight: not only can it depict and thoroughly represent reality, it can also 
fathom and present its very essential core, which is time. Finding in 
Bazin’s Picasso essay a most valuable ally to the closing argument in 
favor of cinema’s reality-aptitude, Teixeira additionally casts a perhaps 
unexpected light upon the utterly temporal nature of the celebrated 
Bazinian realism. 
Given the transmedial trajectory of British visual artist and film 
director Steve McQueen, and the persistence of painterly and photographic 
models in his video and filmic imagery, Susana Viegas, in her article “The 
Integrity of Gesture in Steve McQueen’s Films”, resorts to a comparative 
approach championing cinema’s medium-specific ability to redeem such 
former spatial, frozen representations of the human gesture, reinvested in 
film as its inner temporal “integrity”. Parallelling Teixeira’s core thesis, 
the author postulates a cinematic integrity with “nothing beneath” against 
which its own inner indivisibility can be matched and measured and, thus, 
de-integrated. Faithful to its own concept, this integrity operates 
thoroughly on the temporal, intermedial, ontological, ethical and bodily 
levels. Resonating Bergsonian undertones, the crucial opposition governing 
this integrity runs between deep (temporal, integral) and deceptive 
(spatialized, subdivided) presentations of reality. Viegas argues from a 
Deleuzian perspective: if the cinematic image is to achieve the ultimate 
liberation of time and fulfill the “temporal turn”, it must begin with itself 
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and develop creatively, thus enhancing and bringing to the forefront the 
hidden time-bound quality of reality itself. In the Phenomenological essays 
that follow, we find a similar stress on the self-creative momentum of the 
moving image, way beyond empirical (or “spatialized”) reality, through 
the variational role of imagination within the ‘reality-free’, non-positional 
interface of image consciousness. In this first part of the book, the 
philosophical notions of a substratum-free temporal process of reality 
without positivized “present” (Bergson) and of a non-positional ontology 
of phenomenological suspension without positivized “existence” (Husserl), 
“meet on screen” and engage in a rare dialogue with the cinematic concept 
of the redemption of the integrity of bodies and gestures. Accordingly, in 
McQueen’s cinema, individuals do emerge as ongoing figural, non-
narrative individuation processes, modulated from the inside – a view that 
the next chapter both complements and challenges.  
From the process of individuation we come to a further thematic 
viewpoint, that of personal identity and film, which concerns Carlos João 
Correia’s central purpose in “Cinematographic Narrative and Personal 
Identity”. The author seeks to answer the question of to what extent 
cinema, considered within its narrative dimension and in comparison to 
literature, can advance the elucidation of the main dilemmas of personal 
identity. Correia argues that there is a particularly promising way of 
thinking about personal identity through narrative identity. Both kinds of 
identity do not coincide, naturally, but narrative identity can be 
enlightening for personal identity. Correia examines several historical, 
philosophical, fictional and thought-experimental models. By discussing 
their shortcomings he finally reaches a comprehensive theory and sees 
cinema as possibly the most appropriate vehicle to embody it. According 
to Correia cinema is, among all narrative forms, the most suited to mediate 
first person and third person perspectives. In fact, cinema places selfhood 
(ipse-identity) at the crossroads of the edited narrative-fictional enlargement 
of its self-experience, and the unanswered question concerning its affective 
core, permanently recurring within the long, speechless shot, as in 
Bergman’s Persona, a film that shows how “personal identity” consists 
only of its own endless inquiry. In its own way, this “noble failure” 
anticipates one crucial theme of both the end of the first part and the 
central section of the second: namely, the groundlessness of being itself 
and/or its manifestation, and the ability of film to make that all the more 
evident. 
The Phenomenological angle is addressed by two neighboring, 
complementary exposés: Przemysław Bursztyka in “The Phantasmatic 




Claudio Rozzoni’s “‘Back’ to the Window? A Husserlian Insight into Film 
Image”. 
The main aim of Bursztyka is to provide an outline of the 
phenomenological theory of cinematic experience with special reference to 
its imaginative components. The two – essentially connected – leading 
motifs of the essay are: film as such is a kind of phenomenology, based on 
the same intentions – of revealing and analyzing the modes of appearing of 
the world. While doing this it also suspends the binding power of 
schematic, superficial and pragmatically oriented perception. In this sense, 
film, by its very essence, employs the methodological operation of 
phenomenological reduction. Bursztyka thereby emphasizes the equivalent 
roles of the threefold phenomenological, transcendental and eidetic 
reductions and of cinematic phenomenality, wherein we also find the 
founding epochê of the positional attitude towards reality (the suspended 
screen-world), the effacement of the empirical intramundaneity of the 
subject and the insight into the essence, the limits of perception and of 
representability, which the quintessential cinematic spectacle provides. As 
opposed to a Bazinian approach, film’s “phenomenological reduction”, 
while suspending any existential judgement, reveals the former objective, 
posited factuality of the world as consisting instead of pure phenomenality, 
while cinematic fiction’s role as “eidetic reduction” further discloses its 
ontological consequence: the active synthesis it demands from its “pure 
viewer” obverses the usual relationship between “reality” and the founding 
realm of the possibles, wherein the former is henceforth located. A 
comprehensive reading of the various chapters of the first part suggests 
that the Phenomenological standpoint can thus be seen to converge with 
Bergson’s non-substantial philosophy, preparing a possible post-Deleuzian 
destiny for this lack of underlying ontic reality in the last two essays, 
which scrutinize at different stages the vanishing point of the very 
distinction between virtual and actual, real and mental. 
A closely related angle is disclosed by Rozzoni, who fully rehabilitates 
Husserl philosophy’s wrongly reputed inadequacy regarding aesthetics, 
through a close reading of a set of connected writings from 1904/5, 1912 
and 1918, which allows us to trace the significant deepening of the 
German philosopher’s initial intuition about image consciousness until its 
last, refined stage. Rozzoni accompanies, amongst other aspects, the 
transitional role, between 1912 and 1918, of the ontologically “hefty” 
example of a theatre play. Furthermore, the Bergsonian “movement 
without a mobile” is achieved by Rozzoni in Husserlian terms, those of 
imaginative variations, headed for that eidetic sphere cinematic images so 
rapturously spotlight – not unlike the living of pure time on its own terms, 
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which cinematic time-images prodigalize, according to Deleuze and pace 
Bergson. Thereby, Rozzoni’s main question is very simple and yet 
complicated at the same time: How can we characterize the film image, 
taking into account the triad of an “image thing [Bildding]”, an “image 
object [Bildobjekt]” and an “image sujet” – once we abandon the depicting 
bond for characterizing figurative art? The answer lies alongside the line 
Rozzoni minutely explores, concerning the sort of specific epochê which 
applies eminently to image-consciousness: in iconic consciousness (by 
watching a movie), we are prompted by the phenomenon itself, and not by 
way of a methodological decision, to live in a state of suspension of any 
position taking whatsoever, concerning the existence or non-existence, the 
reality or non-reality, of the image itself. 
The relation between film image and subjectivity is then the concern of 
the next two essays. “In Reality: The Ultimate Cinematic Quest” by José 
Manuel Martins is an approach to the philosophical consequences of the 
indiscernibility of dream and life, the false and truth in film. Martins 
claims that in a world where, through the device of technology, it has 
become impossible to tell life and dreams apart, the classical philosophical 
struggle for reality - from Plato’s Cave through to Descartes’s Malign 
Genius, Kant’s Copernican revolution and Hegel’s “in itself for us” - no 
longer applies. Martins observes that in the recent technological age a new 
transcendental screen arises between the subject and itself and between the 
subject and reality, a screen in a double sense, to be denominated as a 
techno-transcendental equipment. In order to distinguish the external 
screen of representations and the “immanent” brain-screen of neuro-
images, Martins proposes to reinterpret the Deleuzian movement-image / 
time-image binomial in terms of Patricia Pisters’ Neuro-image. He takes 
the case of the movies eXistenZ and Inception, which are purely neuronal 
films and not temporal ones any more. The new ontological angst no 
longer lies in this classical philosophical state of a permanent (de facto) 
deceptiveness or lack, regarding “true reality”, but in the sheer 
impossibility (de jure) of recognizing it, were one to ever come across its 
realm – either because “reality” itself vanished and only its ghost remains, 
under the guise of a formal constraint to “quest” for it (the ultimate 
MacGuffin); or because the very question is itself completely obliterated 
and no longer applies within the circumscription of a self-enclosed world, 
as we may see in the next essay by Atėnė Mendelytė. In the first case, 
“reality” as a heuristic phantom still plays a structural role in layering the 
“vertically” stratified stage where the quest takes place (to the great 




monadically around itself to the point of its Beckettian disappearance, 
“without no outside”. 
Following on from this approach, Atėnė Mendelytė in “The Filmic 
Century/Centuries of the Mind – Tracing the Beginnings of the Subjective 
Cinema” develops another perspective of mental worlds in film, in 
particular subjective worlds. Mendelytė proposes the neologism “sobjective 
cinema”, a subjective yet subjective-objective cinema, referring to given 
film worlds, which are contracted and subtracted by a specific filmic 
perception, the “objective” subjectivity of the “mental image”. This mental 
image is a complement to Gilles Deleuze's mental image, yet by no means 
to be confounded with it. Mendelytė defines the characteristics of her 
mental image: Firstly, the virtual mental becomes the only existing reality, 
substituting the actual. Secondly, its time is timelessness, escaping from 
the three Bergsonian syntheses of time. Most importantly, in the mental 
image the whole filmic universe has to be mentalized in one way or 
another and such a mentalization can be specifically based on a number of 
mental modes: hallucinations, affects, memories and dreams which here 
become parts of the actual. Furthermore, there is a subtle although 
significant difference between the time-image's indiscernibility of the real 
and the fictional, the actual and the virtual, the physical and the mental and 
the mental image's presentation of the mental as the actual. The three 
intriguing case-studies selected by Mendelytė – Shimane’s Odds and 
Ends, Beckett’s television plays and Maya Deren’s seminal Meshes of the 
Afternoon – allow us to perceive the inimitable cinematic means employed 
for the ontological purpose of ruling out any “outside” and thus converting 
the remaining “mental” “inside” into the sole absolute, neither subjective 
nor objective, but both – which is not to be confounded with the 
antepredicative phenomenologically given, adressed in previous essays. It 
is not, e.g., the confinement within a claustrophobic room where time has 
blatantly come to a halt, together with the immobile attendance of the 
isolated character, that does the trick (not the stasis of the shot, not the 
theatrical side of the presentation), but the unremittingly centripetal 
properties of all the objectual, spatial, temporal and meaningful elements 
of the film, leading into each other through montage as much as they are 
devoid of any outward horizon, as happens in the circular vertigo of 
indeterminate time, space and meaningfulness of objects in Meshes.  
The second part entitled “Ontological Realism and Accessing Truth 
Through Film” somehow constitutes the core of our contribution to the 
field. It follows up on some recent discussion of different and new forms 
of realism and materialism, and reacts to film’s immediate capacity to 
reveal a new kind of access to philosophical truth. Thereby the connection 
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between ontology and film is elucidated from different angles. The first 
three texts rely on classical film theory, trying to reassess its potential for 
contemporary debate by framing political as well as epistemological 
consequences. 
Firstly, Leighton Grist in “Bazin, Style, and Digitization: Ontology, 
Epistemology, and the New Myth of Total Cinema” draws attention to the 
new challenges that digital cinema causes to classical film theory and 
reflects on the much debated negation of the pro-filmic in the digital 
image. Grist therefore evokes André Bazin’s conception of cinema that 
sees the photographic image as ontologically indexical, by comparing the 
photographic image to “a fingerprint”, and the photographic process to 
“the molding of death masks”. As a conception of cinema it has, 
accordingly, become increasingly challenged, and even abrogated, through 
the replacement of the photochemical by the digital image, and the 
consequent replacement of the indexical trace by the algorithmic code. 
Grist argues that beyond its own technologically specific significations the 
digital image has a potential to mitigate cinema’s indexical link with a pro-
filmic reality, as digitization is, in its very nature, a manipulable reference: 
it contains the potential to utterly negate the pro-filmic. Consequently, 
some proselytizers of digital cinema have proposed a new myth of total 
cinema, whose connotations are opposed to those of the analogous myth 
that Bazin previously invoked. This paradoxical operation involves, on the 
one hand, a careful reexamination of Bazin’s own internal flexibility 
concerning the complementary aspects of ontological and stylistic 
realism(s) and, on the other hand, a thorough building of the case – via 
Baudrillard and Jameson – of a postmodernist cinema whose perfect “CG” 
simulacrum of reality has fulfilled that mythical totality to the point of no 
longer being cinema, as Bazin himself predicted, but instead, the ultimate 
late capitalist commodity. 
Equally political and following the discussion of the pro-filmic by 
turning it into a more radical issue of the very nature of reality in film, the 
article “The Revolutionary Gaze for the Real: Dziga Vertov’s ‘Kino-Eye’” 
by Tatjana Sheplyakova approaches the question of the filmic fact. 
According to the author, from a philosophical perspective, the cinematic 
“factory of facts” relies on a new kind of normativity that is intrinsically 
connected with Dziga Vertov’s filmmaking. Tatjana Sheplyakova 
therefore focuses on the new logic of normativity that the principle of 
“Kino-Eye” stands for, as well as on those technical elements of the 
dialectical montage through which this logic is brought to realization. In 
the end, she presents an attempt to reassess the “revolutionary” potential of 




making where reality and its assemblage merge into political statements? 
What can we learn from it with regard to a theory of revolutionary action 
today?  
A similar fusion between the sphere of the political and the sphere of 
the philosophical concerns Hyun Kang Kim in “The Blue Flower in the 
Land of Technology: Film, Time, and Politics in Walter Benjamin”. The 
article provides insight into the complexity of Walter Benjamin’s partially 
enigmatic thinking, the scope of which hasn’t yet been exhaustively 
examined. Kim argues that Benjamin establishes an ontology of monism 
of Man (and his technology) and nature on the one hand, and a new 
political philosophy on the other, as conveyed in his epoch-making 
artwork essay. In Benjamin’s monistic approach, technology isn’t opposed 
to the collective body, but rather plays a constitutive role in its production. 
According to Kim, Benjamin abolishes thereby not only the boundary 
between spirit and matter but also the distinction between Man and 
machine. His concept of technology is related to his concept of the 
“optical unconscious”: the film camera works as such and makes visible 
for the human eye what would otherwise remain hidden. For Benjamin, 
technology in general allows access to what Man can’t perceive and 
recognize by himself. Kim concludes therefore that the film camera 
enables a change of perspective from in-itself to for-itself. According to 
Hegel, this change in perspective means the truth. In this sense, technology 
is for Benjamin the place of truth par excellence, and the cinematograph is 
its carrier. The core of Kim’s argument challenges, and indeed redeems 
the loss of reality and of Bazinian cinematic realism Baudrillard’s 
hyperreality was censed to produce, as Grist’s previous essay emphasized: 
technology does not replace reality, rather, it places reality at the crucial 
point where the blue flower blossoms, prompted by the constitutive 
interpenetration of apparatus and reality, which only by this means 
becomes retrospectively manifest as itself technologically mediated and 
constructed. This time through a realist constructivism thesis, reality’s 
non-substantiality keeps resurfacing across the various chapters as one of 
the chief leitmotifs of the book, a fate it shares with the new political 
subject, time-bound (herein coming explicitly across the Bergson – 
Deleuze axis) as much as historically situated and cinematically produced 
by the shock potential of the eminently readable “dialectical image” – 
whose kinship with Deleuze’s crystal-image Kim explores and offers as a 
bonus for the reader. 
The next text opposes an ontological perspective reassessing some of 
the questions raised by Grist, Kim and Sheplyakova. “Philosophy in 
Media Form” is the transcription of a dialogue of two artist-philosophers, 
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namely media-artist Peter Weibel and filmmaker Andrei Ujica, who, after 
the screening of extracts from their filmic work, involve themselves in a 
discussion about the relation between philosophy and film. Peter Weibel in 
his talk makes the criticism that many film theoreticians try to turn cinema 
into a part of ontology, whereas with his film “Chants of the Pluriverse” he 
wanted to demonstrate the opposite: that reality is just a map, and 
therefore can easily be changed with tools. The tools of today, as cinema 
shows, are image machines – a consequence of the motion machine. So the 
big challenge for Weibel, regarding film, is still in front of us: how can we 
generate thinking through the means of technological, moving images? 
With his film Peter Weibel proposes a science of image which goes 
beyond the cut, beyond perception, so that we learn a mode of thinking. 
Technical perception sees what the human eye cannot achieve, or access.  
In this part of the volume Ujica adds to the ongoing debate by 
suggesting that the question about truth in cinema and photography is the 
wrong one to ask. It is based on the illusion that technical media, like 
photography and film, are here to reproduce reality and that reality is the 
truth. This is linked to complex questions such as “Why is reality the 
truth?” and “What is reality?” This is why all these questions are linked to 
ideological and political implications of the period, when the technical 
mediums like photography or film were used as instruments of political 
struggle. They were then used as propaganda and each party was interested 
in establishing its version of the truth.  
 “A Multimodal Theory of Film Experience” by Colin McGinn 
summarises the conclusions of Kim and Weibel, that the film camera 
accesses something to which the human eye does not have access, yet 
orienting the debate toward a very different chain of thought. By 
proposing that the film experience is highly multi-modal, incorporating a 
number of distinct sensory and cognitive channels, McGinn reassess 
Plato’s allegory of the Cave, which is often referred to as being parallel to 
the movie watching experience. As in the cave, so it is argued, watching 
movies is held to be detached from reality, a mere substitute for contact 
with reality — a film is a kind of weightless simulacrum. But is that the 
best way to understand the film experience? McGinn proposes instead that 
it is our experience of the empirical world outside the movie theater that is 
analogous to Plato’s cave dwellers, and our experience within the movie 
theater is analogous to the escapee’s experience outside the cave. In other 
words, we gain a special insight into reality by watching movies, which we 
don’t obtain by means of our ordinary empirical experience. The movie 
screen, argues McGinn, is a window onto a transcendent level of being. 




and the form of knowledge – and, crucially, in their correlation – 
introduced in human history by cinema and cinema alone. The 
phenomenon of film exerts itself twofold: on the side of the moviegoer it 
induces a heightened state of integral consciousness, encompassing and 
merging into one single mental activity of the brain all possible levels of 
perception from dream, sensation, affect and imagination to discursive 
thought and intellectual intuition. On the ontological side, the 
dematerialized entities and events on screen present themselves as a whole 
palette of Platonic universals directly shining through the particular 
beings, featuring them as their carriers, thus filling the age-old gap 
between the sensible and the intelligible. By grasping essence directly 
through the insightful intuition thereof, this approach is not far away from 
the eidetic reduction that Husserlian phenomenology recognizes cinema to 
be able to practice. To sum up, film does not convert reality into its image, 
but rather into its idea, and cinema consists of directly screening whole 
sets of imposing Platonic ideas before the insightful spectator they 
themselves institute and “saturate”. 
Integrated into this line of assimilating film, truth and transcendence, 
Christine Reeh in “On the Rise of Solaristic Philosophy” argues that from 
an epistemological point of view, film’s transcendence of materiality 
inquires into the nature of reality and the way we have access to what is 
real. Reeh thereby sketches a proposal of ontology of film committed to 
this perspective by proposing a reliance on the fictive set up of the movie 
“Solaris” by Andrei Tarkovsky. What makes this movie so intriguing is 
exactly its inquiry into a withdrawing realm of reality and the real where 
presence and simultaneous absence actually cross. The most important 
chain of argumentation then is that film conveys the impossible vision of 
the Heideggerian “being a whole”, which Dasein only achieves in death. 
For several reasons being-in-film is a being-in-death, relying on a spectral 
characterization of film. Correspondingly, being-on-Solaris is the 
transcendent sphere of the dead. It develops the cinematographic principle 
of transcendence of matter into a being-without-being. Reeh then sets this 
being-without-being as the main aesthetic and conceptual principle of her 
solaristic system and as the main ontological characteristic of film, 
unfolding “a new relationship to the Real itself” (Alain Badiou).  
The crucial importance of this chapter consists of bringing to fruition 
what can be discerned as the guiding principle underlying the “second 
part’s ontology” in this volume, in contrast to the first. The initial series of 
essays examines to what extent film, suspected of betraying the very 
essence of being, on the contrary embodies and unravels it, offering 
philosophy in return a few exemplary ontological and epistemological 
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models for the nature of reality. Reality – similarly to film – is seen now as 
a Bergsonian non-substantial duration, further as a Husserlian non-
positional phenomenological appearance, then as a Deleuzian temporal 
compound of virtuality and actuality… Each position starts, however, 
from the immediate phenomenological given of the cinematic image in the 
spectatorial context, keeping the parallel realms of reality and image 
somehow separated until the later eventually close in upon itself, 
completing and exalting the sphere of pure image: what is thus skipped, 
happens to be the very linkage – either material, representational, or 
ontological – between reality and the image thereof. This is precisely the 
point of the entire second series, variously based on a strong Bazinian 
thesis that provides the springboard for its own in-depth reassessment. 
While Grist’s article demonstrates it a contrario, by showing that the 
digital subrogation of the material continuum of reality and image ends up 
in the dissolution of both cinema and reality, Kim’s or Sheplyakova’s 
Vertovian constructivism installs the cinematic image as a revolutionary 
praxis in the middle of reality, which it only registers as far as it penetrates 
and transforms it – for it takes a constructive power to reveal another. The 
image no longer merely addresses the spectator phenomenologically, 
within a model-to-model correspondence with reality, it traces reality back 
to its real, in front of the spectator it engages and helps generate 
therethrough. In McGinn, the filmic image is itself the operator that 
converts the material event of being it seizes through light (it photo-
graphs) into the sensible act of self-presentation of its own Platonic idea: 
onscreen, a particular red (thing) is raised through dematerialization to its 
pure being red, enabling the spectator to watch first-hand an ongoing 
Platonic “participation”, when “general” (though not abstract universal) 
redness presents itself “there” as “that one” and the essence allows itself to 
be seen by an essential vision; and yet this is but the operation of 
cinematic photography upon the pro-filmic reality which shows through. 
Christine Reeh’s starting point is then the aforementioned strong 
Bazinian thesis of the transference of reality from the actual thing to its 
photographic image, generating the presence of absence by giving it the 
same impact as reality because of the special reproductive ability that 
photography set in motion has. Reversing the cinematic course from 
reality to its image, what the ontologically puzzling notion of a re-
produced reality points back to is that the transcendental real of 
reproduction abides in Being’s innermost ontological core: as a void 
(Lacan) and a time-bound (Heidegger) absolutely infinite multiplicity 
(Badiou), Being’s non-being (Heidegger’s “nothingness”) attests its own 




as simply an adventitious technological property of a new medium, in a 
Benjaminian sense. Being is utmostly “film-ic” in its very essence, and a 
movie about the reproducibility of non-being like Solaris shines as a film 
about being because it is a film about cinema, and conversely. Moreover, 
it provides the kind of extreme cinematic thought experiment that allows 
the author to think about being in an unprecedented way, and to ask all the 
(im)pertinent post-ontological questions. As the film par excellence of 
Bazinian transference, Solaris also conjoins and merges into one the two 
different lines of enquiry – physical, and philosophical – concerning 
matter and being: in fact, light has the property to transcend both matter 
and being, for it is the one vehicle able to survive and to presentify the 
self-absence structure upon which film and being alike are established. But 
all this is just half of the story of Harey, as the essay continues: if you 
want to know about being, cherchez la femme. 
The ontological angle is further complemented in Josef Früchtl’s text 
“Aesthetic-Philosophical Realism: How Intuition Matters for Ontology 
and Cinema”. As Früchtl proposes, Gilles Deleuze and Stanley Cavell 
offer prominent examples for a deep connection between theorizing film 
and ontology. For Deleuze ontology means a reversal of the ratio between 
identity and dif¬ference, between what is identifiable and thus being, and 
what cannot be identified. Deleuze connects this idea epistemologically to 
intuition as non-discursive and metaphysical knowledge. As Früchtl 
argues, Deleuze’s concept of intuition is better understood as a gesture that 
should be unfolded in a consequent aesthetic and cinematic way. In a side 
turn, Früchtl views the so-called speculative turn in continental 
materialism and realism as an alternative to Deleuze and Bergson. He 
regards as striking that Quentin Meillassoux’ ontology, based on 
mathematics, has to refer to intuition, in the sense of intellectual intuition, 
going back to Descartes and Kant, meaning a productive unity of thought 
and being. Yet to draw a conclusion as regards cinema, Bergon’s concept 
of intuitive knowledge remains the most helpful to Früchtl. An intuition 
can present us an object (in-itself) only immediately, and as something, 
which cannot be identified via concepts, yet (in Bergson’s words) by 
“images”, or “flexible, mobile, almost fluid representations”, or “gestures” 
Film can be regarded as the most adequate medium for this. It is an art of 
gesture that returns narrative and movement to images and in such a way 
delivers an objectivization of intuition.  
 
In the third part “Unmasking Violence – Trauma and Film” we have 
gathered together closely related essays and prompted a film-philosophical 
discussion of trauma in film, inquiring into violence in film, as well as into 
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ethics, and finally into the nature of the documentary image. Suffering 
compels any ontology of the real and any politics of cinema to become an 
ethics of reality and a deontology of the image. Accordingly, the 
relationship at stake is no longer the Bazinian one of the image to reality 
or the Deleuzian one of the image to itself, but that of the workings of the 
image upon itself in order to retrieve the sorrowful heart of the real that is 
desperately hiding in it. Not in the face of reality in general, but of this 
reality that allows no escaping, the ethical urge of actual pain and 
suffering and death demands a specific sort of epistemological operation 
that transcends reflexion and, in a way, philosophy itself. It is with this 
Other of philosophy that film-philosophy concerns itself in the following 
chapters. 
In “Where's The Rewind Button On The BETAMIX Of Life? Cruelty 
As Transgression And Virtualization In Michael Haneke’s Funny Games” 
Schaub assumes that with its fixation on causes rather than effects, neither 
the traditional philosophical discourse of evil, nor the sociological debate 
on violence, offers an explanation of why cruelty, though ostracized, 
remains an ubiquitous and culturally adaptive practice. With this text 
Schaub proposes to reconstruct cruelty as a powerful scheme of behavior 
and reflection bound together by the notion of transgression and 
virtualization. The latter becomes obvious in Michael Haneke’s counter-
use of traditional stage techniques (such as the Brechtian estrangement 
effect) in his scandalous movie Funny Games (Austria 1997). Instead of 
enabling us to distance ourselves from the (poorly) seen and (massively) 
heard, we, the spectators, become hostages and witnesses alike. Our 
powerlessness is thus only deepened. Whereas many praise the film’s 
fundamental critique of modern media use, Schaub argues that the “forced 
emotional interaction” with the gruesome reveals regular traits of our 
conditio humana, shot through with claims to legitimacy and truth.  
The title “Mask” brings together three different interventions on the 
film Faces by Christoph Korn, two of which have been orally presented 
(by the director and the deceased Cristina Beckert). The third, by Maria 
João Madeira, involved the screening of the film at the Lisbon 
Cinemateca. In her text Madeira explains the background to Christoph 
Korn’s film work, based on the slowdown of “found footage” – namely 
the 23 min. fragment of Theresienstadt. Ein Dokumentarfilm aus dem 
jüdischen Siedlungsgebiet, produced by the Nazis and filmed in 1944 in 
the concentration camp Theresienstadt, as a pseudo documentary about life 
in the "ghetto Terezin," which for many Jews was the previous stop to 
their deportation and extermination in Auschwitz or Treblinka. The film’s 




left Nazi Germany in 1933. He was then arrested in Holland after the 
occupation, sent to the concentration camps of Westbork and 
Theresienstadt, and finally killed in Auschwitz in October 1944, just after 
having concluded the film. Korn explains that the composer Antoine 
Beuger came up with the idea of a dialogue throughout the film to replace 
the deep frequency sound, allowing the possibility of the viewer to be 
somehow with the filmed people during the 12 hours of the film’s 
duration. “The conversation is borne by a peaceful, tentative, often silent 
sense of approaching and receding. In the course of the conversation, a 
type of reading gains both duration and power, a type that becomes 
condensed in the concept of the ‘face’ by Emmanuel Levinas.” (Korn)  
Beckert explains that the face for Levinas is not the totality of the 
physical shape. It is rather a metaphysical and an ethical concept, 
presenting the absolute otherness of the other. We can’t grasp it through 
knowledge or mere consciousness. Beckert stresses that Korn’s film is 
about many faces, visible in their smallest details, due to the slow motion 
of the film. Yet how can we put together the invisible face of Levinas and 
the visibility of the faces in the film? Beckert proposes that when these 
faces look directly at the camera, there is the look of the face, provoking a 
strange reaction in us. We are seen directly, but we can’t see. We are 
absolutely passive and must offer ourselves to that look. This is the effect 
the face has upon us: it poses the terrible question of my right to be, and 
not that of the other.  
The base for the montage of Susana de Sousa Dias’ “48” lies in the 
cinetic ambiguity of its images and in its narrative modalities. From this 
ambiguity, the next chapter, “A Sort of Microscope of Time: Decelerated 
Movement and Archive Footage” exposes how the image-word 
articulation promotes not only the pensiveness of spectators during the 
film screening, but also the “pensiveness of the image” (Rancière). 
Particular attention is given to montage of “time depth”, to the specific 
treatment of the testimonies’ temporality, and to the spatio-temporal 
conception of the film. With “48” Susana de Sousa Dias creates a living 
requiem from recently excavated photographs of Portuguese political 
prisoners taken by the Political Police during the 48 year long dictatorship 
of Estado Novo (1926-1974). The hypnotizing sequences of faces flows 
eerily through an absorbing narrative arrangement, guided by the voices of 
the surviving prisoners and the very present ambient space around them. 
The subtle zooms, slow fades and heavy pauses isolate and vibrate the 
historical and emotional charge of the routine identification photos. 
Through a painstaking account of the epistemological consequences and 
the ontological import of a rigorously medium-specific technical work on 
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the material, the author shows how a different historical episteme and 
ethical-political approach stems from the threefold methodological 
procedure of opening up from the inside non-causal and non-narrative 
connexions within the three constituents of the cinematic whole – space, 
time and word – in a crossbreeding between the visual and the aural, the 
present and the past, which is redolent of Deleuzian time-crystal 
meditations. The detailed theoretical explanation provided by Sousa Dias 
spreads beneficially over the kindred essays about Christoph Korn’s and 
Víctor Erice’s very similar cinematic strategies. Together they delineate a 
constellation of chapters revolving around the same paradox or anguish: 
how can the inventiveness of form redeem pain and past, as well as 
retrieve a sense of reality and history that does the dead and the living justice, 
beyond institutional discourse and any clichéd mode of representation? 
Unfolding with a processional cadence and tone the successive sections 
of her sensitive reading of Víctor Erice’s Vidros Partidos, Maria Filomena 
Molder highlights in her essay “Green Leaves, Green Sorrows: On Víctor 
Erice’s Broken Glasses” the almost confidential thematic web of the film, 
attuning resonant chords to the final constellation of this book. The huge 
mural picture of and in the canteen dominates the scene in silence, as a 
visual phantom doubling place and time, whose poignancy is brought to 
bear by the interplay of the words that give the image a voice. As Beckert 
explained, these mute faces regard. and thus concern us, in so far as the 
director’s camera finds a way to let them do so, eyes in eyes. But, if it is 
the words of the living that grant the access to the faces of the dead, 
acknowledged in their muteness by the testimonial rite of reciting as a 
spiritual exercise – analogously to Christoph Korn’s voice-over –, the 
word is in its turn bestowed on these words by “mortifying” them, as they 
become “trans-personal” monologues through the joint workings of the 
characters and the filmmaker, the oral and the written, the lived and the 
fictional. This doubling – and crisscross – of space and time, life and art, 
the living and the dead, relies on the riskier operation of tripling person, 
actor and character. With Erice, Molder calls this act, leading to self-
transcending and self-discovery, “miscegenation”. While confronting the 
silence of the face, the word faces the poignancy of a shared pain it strives 
to heal at the same time – the pain of the living and the dead. Between 
reenactment and simulation, such a truer-to-life sort of documentary 
echoes the final model Víctor Moura also favours, together with the 
concept of “effabulation” Deleuze applies to Jean Rouch’s strategy, which 
corresponds here to the notion of “miscegenation”. And an intriguing 
affinity surfaces at this point: Jean Rouch’s famous title “Moi, un noir” is 




exemplifying the possible senses of the celebrated dictum “Je est un autre” 
– incidently, a subject already tackled in Correia’s chapter, under the label 
of the first vs third person perspective problem, which Molder explores on 
the basis of its illuminating misquoting by Erice. Now, Rouch is the 
master of the effabulation approach as a cinematic device to extract a 
deeper truth in the process of becoming: by quoting Rimbaud, Erice is 
quoting, perhaps unintentionally, the common source of his and Rouch’s 
inspiration, and his “miscegenation” matches Deleuze/Rouch’s “effabulation” 
– or Moura’s “simulation”. Molder’s conception, drawing on Genet, of the 
artwork as an intercessor between the living and the dead, “endowed with 
the strange power of penetrating this domain of death” so that the dead are 
not left enclosed in their pain, in the end meets Christine Reeh’s former 
Being-in-death as a regenerative power of film, where “there is a burning 
that the photographic image cannot absorb: they were there”. 
Finally, in “Unexpected Findings and Documentaries” Vítor Moura 
reexamines the on-going philosophical discussion concerning the precise 
meaning and defining criteria of John Grierson’s 1926 coined term 
“documentary”, mapping the different standpoints of the key interveners in 
relation to one another. The difficulty lies in the object itself: docudrama, 
propaganda film, trans-media documentaries and the genre of “docufiction” 
challenge the defining capability of the “documentary” label and force a 
reassessment of the ideas of objectivity and realism that are inherent to 
that label. Moura then refers to several positions within the analytical 
approach, namely Carl Plantinga and Gregory Currie, who hold two 
opposing standpoints: Currie argues that documentaries are filmed 
narratives and that the corresponding narrative is supported by the images, 
due to the simple fact that these are photographic representations. 
Plantinga sees documentary as an assertion, proposing to define nonfiction 
film as a film in which a filmmaker makes “an assertive stance toward the 
world projected by the film”, a thesis further developed by Noël Carroll 
under the formula “film of presumptive assertion”, where the recognition 
of the structure’s assertive stance through the recognition of the author’s 
intention seems sufficient to distinguish fictional and non-fictional film. 
Moura concludes his detailed analysis by advancing his own theory, 
drawing on a reassesment of the weaknesses and strengths of those of his 
predecessors. The author privileges the Documentaries as Simulations 
model, which blends an appropriate weighting of the relative importance 
of direct visual “evidence” and authoritative testimonial assertion with the 
half-fictional powers of re-enactement and simulation (reminding us, 
though in a quite different key, of the effabulatory quality Deleuze praised 
in Jean Rouch’s practice). This procedure not only provides the 
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opportunity for a constant self-correction and mutual mediation of 
different versions of events alongside the “path of truth”, but also allows 
the “unexpected finding” to supervene and to disruptively reveal, beyond 
“truth”, the secret play of the other side of things.  
Concluding Remarks 
Since the beginning of the new millennium the enquiry into the 
entanglement of film and philosophy has been growing and even become a 
fashion, but there is no institution in the world dedicated to this field of 
research. In this sense we are hopeful that this collection helps to establish 
– besides the analytical discussion prominently engaged by Noël Carroll - 
a continental project of philosophy of film, which resumes but may also go 
beyond the domination of Deleuzian thought and the references to Stanley 
Cavell. Both are committed to a perspective on film, which cannot be 
separated from a specific, broader project of philosophy, in which the 
concern about film is only one chapter, not to be understood without 
referring to the whole framework. We hope with this volume to inspire 
future generations of philosophers who may reveal the yet unexplored 
potential of films to philosophically explain the world and raise new 






PART 1 –  
MENTAL APPROACHES:  
ON THE NATURE OF TIME,  




THE IMAGE OF TEMPORALITY 




Bergson’s philosophy is founded on the study of change, movement and 
duration. Time is depicted as duration (la durée). It is a qualitative reality, 
which is hard to seize. When it is seized, it no longer maintains its 
temporal character; it becomes spatialised time. When time is measured, it 
is replaced by space. And space, as we understand it, is a homogeneous 
medium. Conscious experience, Bergson contends, is heterogeneous, i.e. it 
cannot be seized as if it were composed of different elements. States of 
consciousness interpenetrate as they carry the past into the present. 
Duration is indivisible and whole. Whenever we try to take it into parts, 
we draw spatial representations of time. Change and movement are also 
qualitative. We can perceive differences of states and different becomings. 
But when we truly perceive change and movement, we grasp them in their 
wholeness and indivisibility. On the other hand, when we try to measure 
movement, we spatialise it and represent it as the contiguous points that 
make up a line. Juxtaposition replaces wholeness and indivisibility. 
In a famous passage at the end of Creative Evolution, Bergson makes 
use of the cinematographic image to describe the way we usually represent 
movement. Like the images of the cinematograph, our representation of 
movement is a collection of snapshots, i.e. a collection of immobile and 
juxtaposed images. As the cinematographic unrolls, it brings about an 
illusory movement that is in effect composed of many contiguous 
immobile images. Our knowledge of things is mostly exterior to them. We 
generally do not try to seize their inner becoming. So we end up taking 
snapshots of reality, and re-making it artificially with these bits and pieces. 
Our knowledge of things is directed towards action and action is 
discontinuous. In action, isolated and clear-cut pieces replace becoming 
and the continuous, heterogeneous flow of reality. 
Bergson has been criticised by many for his cinematographic analogy. 
Cinema could hardly be taken as an artistic means of expression, because 
it would be unable to capture duration in its pure form. If the camera is 




only capable of making successive snapshots of reality, then we will have 
no depiction of temporality, only still photographs that picture frozen, 
immobile moments.  
However, Bergson’s recourse to the cinematograph should be seen 
solely as an analogy that wants to stress the similitude between our 
intellect and the mechanical aspect of cinema. Its mechanics offer a very 
good representation of our intellectual knowledge of the external world. 
Our knowledge, like the camera recording, is a collection of juxtaposed 
images, nothing else. This does not mean that cinematography cannot 
represent true duration. To illustrate how cinema can contribute 
significantly to the understanding and depiction of duration, we will draw 
on Bergson’s favourite metaphor: music.  
Bergson emphasises how we overlook true duration, so that we can 
focus on everything that fosters our action in the world. Everything is 
forced upon us in a logical or mathematical way. The world thus becomes 
a non-temporal, static entity. The goals of our activity in the world 
determine what is in our minds. We do not care about the movements that 
make up our action. The mind focuses only on the goals we want to 
achieve. Bergson writes: “The intellect, then, only represents to the 
activity ends to attain, that is to say, points of rest. And, from one end 
attained to another end attained, from one rest to another rest, our activity 
is carried by a series of leaps, during which our consciousness is turned 
away as much as possible from the movement going on, to regard only the 
anticipated image of the movement accomplished.”1  
True duration is thus not perceived; it does not even attract our 
attention. Our consciousness only represents the fixed, immobile results of 
our action, because our activity is developed within the material world. If 
we pictured matter in its dynamic and flowing aspect, we could assign no 
end to our actions. We do not seize change in itself; we need to identify a 
mobile before we can seize movement. Permanence can only be 
guaranteed through the repetition of movements. “The primal function of 
perception is precisely to grasp a series of elementary changes under the 
                                                 
1 Creative Evolution, pp. 299-300. « L’intelligence ne représente donc à l’activité 
que des buts à atteindre, c’est-à-dire des points de repos. Et, d’un but atteint à autre 
but atteint, d’un repos à un repos, notre activité se transporte par une série de 
bonds, pendant lesquels notre conscience se détourne le plus possible du 
mouvement s’accomplissant pour ne regarder que l’image anticipée du mouvement 





form of a quality or of a state, by a work of condensation.”2 Action implies 
the concentration of elementary changes or vibrations. Our perception 
contracts millions of vibrations into one instant of time. That is how we 
perceive quality. Bergson had recourse to the example of red light, which 
became famous. He illustrated how perception synthesises millions of 
vibrations; as a result of that synthesis we can see a unified red light.  
Bergson distinguished our durée from general time, because we can 
only be aware of a “limited number of phenomena.”3 There seems to be a 
continuity of matter. Life, on the other hand, is evolution. But our 
perception is able “to concentrate a period of this evolution in a stable 
view which we call a form”4, although things constantly change. “What is 
real is the continual change of form: form is only a snapshot view of a 
transition. Therefore, here again, our perception manages to solidify into 
discontinuous images the fluid continuity of the real.”5  
We are never free of the artifices of language, and for that matter of 
perception. Perception extracts from different and individualised sorts of 
becoming a sole representation that synthesises all those diverse flows of 
reality. In so doing, it immobilises the real so that we can get hold of it. 
We tend to lay these still images side by side, in juxtaposition. Now, if 
these images succeed one another rapidly enough, they will create the 
illusion that they are moving. This mechanism that places very similar 
images side by side for the appearance of movement is called the 
cinematographic image. Bergson’s well-known example of the marching 
regiment duly illustrates this mechanism: “take a series of snapshots of the 
passing regiment and […] throw these instantaneous views on the screen, 
so that they replace each other very rapidly. This is what the 
cinematograph does. With photographs, each of which represents the 
regiment in a fixed attitude, it reconstitutes the mobility of the regiment 
marching.”6 This passage shows very clearly how we never perceive 
                                                 
2 Ibid. p. 301; « La première fonction de la perception est précisément de saisir une 
série de changements élémentaires sous forme de qualité ou d’état simple, par un 
travail de condensation. » Ibid. p. 300/749.  
3 Matter and Memory, p. 272-273. Matière et mémoire, p. 230-231/340. 
4 Creative Evolution, p. 302. « Nous concentrons une période de cette évolution en 
une vue stable que nous appelons une forme […] » L’évolution créatrice p. 
301/750. 
5 Ibid. p. 302; « Ce qui est réel, c’est le changement continuel de forme : la forme 
n’est qu’un instantané pris sur une transition. Donc, ici encore, notre perception 
s’arrange pour solidifier en images discontinues la continuité fluide du réel. » Ibid. 
p. 302/750.  
6 Ibid. p. 305; « C’est de prendre sur le régiment qui passe une série d’instantanées, 
et de projeter ces instantanées sur l’écran, de manière qu’ils se remplacent très vite 
